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This thesis presents an analysis of the application of the Modular Command and
Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) to the Identification Friend, Foe, or Neutral
(IFFN) Joint Testbed. The MCES and IFFN Testbed evaluation approaches are also
compared. MCES is a structured approach to evaluate Command and Control (C2)
systems which uses standard and evolving operational research tools. The MCES
approach provided the IFFN Joint Testbed with an air defense C2 system architecture
which became a descriptive tool for C2 analysts to define and evaluate measures to
determine the effectiveness of competing air defense C2 systems. This IFFN
application served as an evaluation and refinement of MCES as well as a tool for
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
How much of a force multiplier can be attributed to a particular command and
control (C") systems? Given several alternative C systems, which is best? What has
to be measured to determine this dilTerence? Are all the relevant factors taken into
account? These are complex C" questions being asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
well as other senior military commanders as they are faced with acquiring, testing, and
operatmg C^ systems.
A methodology is needed to describe the C systems architecture which will allow
analysts to measure C'^ systems response and attribute the effectiveness of that
response to the elements or structural relationships which form that C system. There
is a definite need for generic tools to evaluate C systems and architectures. What was
lacking in current C*- evaluation methodologies was a method to relate C systems to
measures of its contribution to force efiectiveness and mission accomplishment. In the
past, C'^ evaluation has been conducted in a piecemeal fashion with assorted evaluation
tools only for specific parts of the problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Command,
Control and Communications Systems Directorate's (JCS C3S) recognized these needs
and required development of a paradigm to evaluate competing C" architectures
[Ref 1: p. 8]. The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES)
attempts to address this need.
B. MCES METHODOLOGY
MCES was developed as a structured approach to evaluate C" systems and uses
standard and evolving operations research tools. MCES attempts to integrate the
previous elTorts of C users and analytic organizations to form a single C evaluation
package.
The MCES is composed of seven separate modules which guide analysts through
the command and control evaluation. Figure LI represents the seven modules of the
MCES methodology and the output from each module. The first module is used by
the analyst and operational user to define the particular Q problem. The next three
modules set the terminology and theory to describe the C^ system architecture which






















rigure 1.1 MCES Modules.
methodology is a need to describe the C system as an architecture mtegrating physical
elements and process functions into a structural framework. MCtS shares common
terminology of current C systems evaluation methodologies. The MCES defines
"arciiitecture" as a description of an integrated set of systems whose physical entities,
structure and functions are coherently related. The architecture provides a
representation which will eventually lead to the ability to measure the C~ system
response and the elTectiveness of directing forces to accomplish the mission. The C"
theory' behind these modules is robust enough to allow analysts to reconfigure the
particular C^ system physically or structurally within the architecture during the C^
evaluation. In module 5, measures are developed which will be used to discriminate
between alternative configurations of the architecture. When the measures for theC"
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system have been identified, the sixth module requires that a suitable data generator be
selected or developed to derive the values for the measures selected. The final MCES
module is used to aggregate and evaluate the C measure results in order to determine
the optimal C^ system for a particular mission. [Ref. 1: pp. 10-23]
C. MCES EVOLUTION
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) was
developed at the Naval Postgraduate School with research support from the Military'
Operations Research Society (MORS) and monetary' support from different military
agencies [Ref. 2: p. 13]. The MCES development started with military community
research and discussion concerning the need to develop and quantify measures of
effectiveness appropriate to C^ systems. According to the MCES principal
investigator, Dr. Ricki Sweet, MCES is evolving as any scientific development in the
following steps [Ref 1: p. 31]:
1. Public discussion and mandate for clarification;
2. Setting up the nature of the problem, the tools, definitions, and potential
directions;
3. First order development of the identified components;
4. Specification of the interrelationships of the components;
5. Testing of the theory with real problems, i.e., extra-laboratory experiments; and
6. Refining the structure in accordance with the test results.
The MCES methodology is evolving in order to resolve key C issues.
Throughout this evolution, C" tools and models have been identified, developed, and
integrated into the MCES. Having completed the first cycle of the referenced six steps
of scientific development, MCES is now in the process of a continuing iteration of the
last two steps of test and refinement. The Identification Friend, Foe or Neutral
(IFFN) Joint Testbed application is an example of such a MCES test and refinement
iteration. This scientific development will lead to a further refined, bounded and
generic methodology that may fulfill many C^ architecture evaluation requirements.
D. IFFN BACKGROUND
The IFFN testbed is currently addressing the air identification problem, which is
a subset of the overall air defense C^ problem. The testbed is representative of the
NATO air defense C"^ system which must operate in an environment of friendly, enemy
and neutral aircraft to perform its air defense mission. Within the air defense C
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architecture, geographically separated radars and special intelligence sources develop
detection, track, and identification information on air objects. Computers are then
used to store and correlate this information. Digital communications are then used to
share the track information between command facihties. The command organizations
develop perceptions of the battle situation and make decisions to achieve mission goals
based on these perceptions. The command organization then implements the decisions
by directing and controlling air defense forces to take some action against the enemy
forces. The test concept uses a computer simulation of manned and simulated
command centers and weapon systems employing real world operating procedures
against varied threat scenarios. [Ref 3: pp. 3-5]
The IFFN C system bounds were defined by geographic areas of responsibility
within the NATO Fourth AUied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF) sector. The specific
command centers that perform the C functions are: Sector Operations Centers
(SOC), Control and Reporting Centers (CRC), Brigade Fire Direction Centers (Bde
FDC), and BattaUon Fire Direction Centers (Bn FDC). Information sources
considered to be within the C system are: NATO Airborne Early Warning systems
(NAEW), Special Information (inteUigence) Systems (SIS), and other information
sources (i.e., fiight plans). The air defense C system architecture included the weapon
systems when they performed C functions. The air defense weapon systems
considered by the IFFN testbed are the F-15, all weather fighter, and the HAWK and
PATRIOT surface-to-air missiles (SAMS).
E. MCES APPLICATION TO THE IFFN TESTBED
A MORS workshop team specifically researched the IFFN problem during a
conference to assist the IFFN Testbed in finding a solution to the IFFN problem. The
initial C problem statement formulated by the January 1985 MORS Workshop from
the original IFFN Testbed issues was:
How effective is the Central Europe air defense C2 svstem in providing decision
makers the means to assess the situation and emplov air defense assets in order
to meet overall mission objectives? [Ref 4: p. 1]
During the 1985 MORS C^ Evaluation Workshop, the IFFN Test Director, Colonel
Dave Archino issued the following challenge to the working group:
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Develop a tool . . . specific to air defense that allows IFFN to evaluate the flow
of C2 information throushout the C2 striicture and determine if it is useful or not
in wmnms the war . . . nieetina the mission objectives . . . and operational issues
IFFN plans to address. [Ref -T: p. 1]
It was determined that MCES could be tailored to help solve the IFFN testbed
requirements. Major Patrick Gandee, while a Naval Postgraduate School student, was
the principal investigator of the MCES application to the IFFN Testbed.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis will summarize how the MCES was specifically applied to the air
defense problem and how that application has been used by the IFFN testbed to
address their operational issues. A comparison of the IFFN Testbed and MCES
approaches will be presented. Since MCES was concurrently evaluated and refined in
the IFFN application process, this thesis will continue the evolution process by
formulating recommendations for further MCES refinement.
The MCES methodology will be outlined in Chapter II. The IFFN Testbed and
its evaluation approach will be described in Chapter III. Chapter IV will describe the
application of MCES to the IFFN Testbed. .A discussion of the differences between
the MCES and IFFN Testbed approach is presented in Chapter V. Conclusions and
recommendations concerning both the IFFN Testbed and the MCES methodology are
presented in Chapter VI.
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II. MCES METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The following description of MCES is taken in part from Dr. Sweet's report on
MCES [Ref. I: pp. 10-23] and from her notes and briefings. The figures presented in
this chapter are revised and updated versions of the ones she used in her publications
and briefings. A more detailed description and analysis of MCES will be presented in
Chapter IV when the VICES application to the IFFN testbed is used as an example.
B. MCES MODULES
MCES is divided into seven modules which are detailed below by module.
1. Module I: Problem Formulation
In module 1, the decision-maker's analysis objectives and needs are described
for a specific C problem. First, the decisionmaker's needs are characterized. The
analysts consider the decisions being formulated, assumptions about the problem, the
level of analysis required, and the mission supported. Both the appropriate scenarios
and assumptions underlying the evaluation are made explicit and the required level of
analysis is determined. This problem statement is then used in the second module to
bound the C system of interest. The implementation of this module results in a more
precise statement of the problem and analysis objectives. Figure 2.1 lists the major
actions required in module 1. [Ref 1: pp. 10-11]
2. Module 2: C System Bounding
Module 2 identifies the relevant system elements that will bound the system.
When bounding the C system, a three component definition of a C2 system is used
based on JCS Publication 1 [Ref 5: p. 77]. These definitions state that a C system
consists of physical entities, structures, and C processes. Physical entities are
equipment, software, people and their associated facilities. Structure includes
organization, procedures, protocols, concepts of operation and information flow
patterns. The term "C process" refers to what the system is doing or the functions
that the process performs. Bounding the system requires bounding of the physical
entities and structure. The C processes are developed in Module 3.
There are two issues that are raised in this module. The first issue is the

























Figure 2.1 Module 1, Problem Formulation.
The second issue concerns determining the required levels of analysis. One method of
graphically illustrating this process of bounding the environment is through the use of
Dr. Sweets "onion " as a representative of the environment. The insert of Figure 2.2
displays this representation. Starting in the middle of the onion are the subsystems of
the ("" system. Going out Irom the middle, the C" subsystems constitute the C2
system. The C' system is itself a component of the overall force which in turn is a
part of the environment. The area outside of the "Onion Skin" is the rest of tiie world.
Successive peeling' of the "onion skin" will revel the C" subsystems to be evaluated.
.Module 2 results in the bounding of the problem and the identification and
categorization of the system elements of physical entities and organizational structure.
Figure 2.2 depicts the activities for Module 2. [Ref 1: pp. 12-13]
3. Module 3: C" Process Definition
.Module 3 defines the processes needed to fulfill the C" mission. The
particular command and control process is described by analyzing the generic C
processes of the system. The proposed MCES solution to understanding the C"^
processes of a particular C system is to use an information based paradigm similar to
the J. I.awson C" Process Model (Ref 6: pp. 93-99] in the broader framework of
























Figure 2.2 Module 2, C^ System Bounding.
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model. One example of Lawsons generic C^ loop model components is the ASSESS
block. The assessments for human decisions are made by battle commanders
performing the .A.SSESS function. The commanders' assessments are made by
perceiving and assigning meaning to the overall situation. Commanders use
information from their own sensors, feedback from their forces, and an interface with a
separate intelligence process to develop these perceptions about the enemy and friendly
capabilities. The other functions of Lawsons generic C" process model are performed
in most C~ processes. [Ref 1: p. 14]
It is necessary to provide a translation of the vocabulary of the C"^ problem
into the terminology of the generic C process model to effectively use MCES. This
translation of terms helps the analyst keep from overlooking critical processes and
provides standard vocabulary and definitions. In the past, MCES has been able to
apply the generic C process model successfully with only minor modifications. There
are dilTerent C" process levels and interactions among the C process function
components and these process relationships can become very complex. To illustrate
dilTerent levels of processes, an example of a commander performing a decision
function can be used. The commander passes his decision to several subordinates who
in turn work out detailed instructions to implement that decision. These subordinates
communicate the instructions to their forces which then act in the environment. In
command and control terms, the commander and the subordinates were performing
separate decision functions within a C^ process. The subordinates' decision function is
related to the commander's decision function by the commander's decision (output)
and the subordinates' receipt (input). In turn, the detailed instructions from the
subordinates to the force couple the subordinate's function to the force function. This
functional input; output relationship forms a "structure" between separate C process
functions which are required to perform the mission. The structure determines the
information flow. [Ref. 1: p. 15]
In a distributed C system, processes may be related to other processes. The
processes that have been valuable to MCES C^ evaluations for describing distributed
information flow are [Ref. I: pp. 70-73]:
1. Intelligence (INTELL) Process. Assigns meaning .to observed activities and
situations and forecasts changes in the current situation.
2. Crosstell (XTELL) Process. A subset of the communications process, which
provides for sharing ol^ information throughout the C2 system to support
decisions and their implementation.
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Figure 2.3 Module 3, C^ Process Definition.
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A complete picture of the C" systems architecture includes the intelligence process and
how it interfaces with the C" process. XTELL is the sharing of information and is
needed to describe the coordination between distributed C^ systems. At a single
command node, XTELL is simply a process function but on a systems level it is a
networking process. At a single node, the C^ process directly controls weapon
systems. At a higher level, the C" process coordinates the directing of the weapon
systems. These processes are dynamic descriptions of what the C system is doing.
XTELL and INTELL processes interfaced with the C process in a distributed system
are ultimately linked to the weapon systems which perform the mission.
Dr. Sweet emphasizes that this module forces the analysts attention on
[Ref I: p. 14]:
1. the environmental cause or initiator (i.e., the enemy force) of the C2 process
that results from a change in the desired state;
2. the internal C2 process functions that characterize what the svstem is doing
such as sense, assess, generate, select, plan, and direct; and
3. the input and output from the internal C2 process that couples with the force
process
Figure 2.3 represents the major actions required in module 3. As a result of the
implementation of this module, the functions of the C process for a given problem are
identified and mapped to the generic C'^ process loop.
4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions
Module 4 relates the information flow to a C system by means of its C"
process functions. Functions are subsets of the C" process and represent what the C2
system actually does or accomplishes. The relationship of the C physical entities to
the process functions and organizational structure is also formulated in this module.
This integration is accomplished by making explicit the relationships between these
components. Figure 2.4 outlines the actions required in Module 4.
The first step is to map the physical entities of man and machine which
perform the functions and produce output to an organizational structure. All C
functions can be potentially performed in a single node or be distributed between
different nodes so this mapping results in an organizational structure which graphically
depicts a single node or a distribution of command and weapon nodes depending on
the system's unique configuration.
Next, the flow of information is charted by techniques such as Data Flow

























Figure 2.4 Module 4, Integration of System Elements and Functions.
describe information flow through the C" process model. DFDs and Petri Nets will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapters V and VI. DFDs are an example of a technique
that has been productive in this module in determining relationships between processes
and information How. Data Flow Diagrams (DI-Ds) are first constructed to show
information (low through the C- process model. The inputs and outputs of each
function are determined and related to the other functions in the process. In the next
step, a transform analysis is performed to uncover the transform center (process center)
and to determine the subordinate and superordinate relationships between the
transform center and the individual C" functions. Information Hows into the
transform center and control information flows out of the transform center. These
input output relationships describe the internal information flow between separate
process functions. The data (lowing into the transform center or process center is
information How while the data flow out of the transform center is control information
flow in the form of action requests or commands. Thus a hierarchical "structure" has
been defined in terms of the mission essential information flow between functions
within the C" process. From this information, a C~ system architecture will eventallv
be formulated. These procedures will result in the description of how the elements and
players function together, which is basically relating information How to organizational
structure. [Ref I: pp. 16-17]
5. Module 5: Specification of Measures
Module 5 specifies the measures necessar\' to evaluate the C~ problem. These
measures are then classified as to their level of measurement, i.e., dimensional
parameters, measures of performance (MOPs), measures of elTectiveness (MOEs), or
measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs). MOFEs are used to describe the actions
between the force and the environment. When the C system is combined with the
force, the environment will be effected and MOFEs measure this force effect. Within
the force boundar\-, MOEs are used to measure how the combat force is effected by the
C^ operation. MOPs are applied at the C^ system boundary and measure how well the
C system performs its functions. For the subsystem within the boundary' of the C
system, dimensional parameters are used to measure the limits of the subsystems. The
resulting measures may be used to determine differences in a C system when utilizing
alternative configurations of the physical entities, structure, or processes. Figure 2.5
graphically depicts the "onion" with its corresponding measures and the actions
required in Module 5.
This MCES implementation results in the specification of a set of measures
focused primarily on the process functions. The process functions identified may be
used to derive a complete set of relevant measures which can then be subjected to
further scrutiny. A set of measures can be compared to a set of desired measures
characteristics as shown in Table 1 [Ref. 1: p. 20] to insure that the measures are
useable.
6. Module 6: Data Generation
In Module 5, one of several types of data generators such as exercises,
experiments, simulations, subjective judgements, or relevant experiences is selected to
generate the necessary values for the measures formulated. These values may be either
measured directly or indirectly. The analysts consider the reproduciblity of results,
precision and accuracy, timing of collection, environmental controls, and experimental
design during this module. A timeline is formulated to set the completion dates for the
data generation phases. Using the designated data generator, the resulting values for
these measures constitute the output of this module. Figure 2.6 outlines the data





















MOP (MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE)
MOE (MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS)
MOFE (MEASURE OF FORCE
EFFECTIVENESS)
Figure 2.5 Module 5, Specification of Measures.
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TABLE 1













Relates to force/system mission.
Identifies real difference between
alternatives.
Can be computed or estimated.
Can be assigned numbers or ranked.
Relates realisticly to the C^
system and associated uncertainties.
Can be defined or derived,
independent of subjective opinion.
Relates to acceptable standards and
analysis objectives.
Reflects changes in system variables.
Reflects those standards required
by the analysis objectives.
Is mutually exclusive with respect
to other measures.
Is easily understood by the user.
7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures
Module 7 is the final module and addresses the issue of the aggregation and
interpretation of the observed values of the measures. Figure 2.7 depicts the
aggregation and interpretation process. From data generation, values for the identified
measures will be obtained and analyzed. One of the analysts' concerns will be to relate
command and control systems to some measure of force effectiveness which is
sometimes termed the force multiplier effect. For MOFEs, the intent of aggregation is
to relate the C system with combat systems to indicate combat outcomes. After
aggregation, the issues of measure causality, sufficiency, and independence are to be
considered. Scenario dependence must also be addressed. Because combat is ver>'
complex, many measures will not show significant differences. Analysis must be
































Figure 2.6 Module 6, Data Generation.
crucial point, the analysts must decide if their questions can be answered by their
analysis. Credibility and reliability are major concerns to the decisionmakers.
IRcf. 1: pp. 21,22]
C. COURSES OF ACTION
The results of the MCFiS iteration are provided to the decisionmaker. Figure 2.8
represents the actions and results of each iteration of the MCLS modules. At least two
courses of action are then available to the decisionmaker based on the results. 1 he
decisionmaker may directly implement the results of the MCFS evaluation or he may
identil'y the need for further study or require another iteration o[' the MCHS analysis.
'Ihe decisionmaker may interact with the .\ICFS analysis eilbrt to further guide the
analysts by identifying errors in assumptions, clarifying the bounding, etc. 1 he analysis
could be modified by infusing new directions or objectives based upon the results of
previous MCLS modules completed. T'or example, the bounding of the C" system may
generate the observation that significant interfaces are outside the originally conceived
























Figure 2.7 Module 7, Aggregation of Measures and Interpretation.
D. USES
MCLS can assist in the areas of C^ management and analysis. MCES assists in
the systematic specification of the problem by focusing on identified essential
characteristics of the C" system, it permits a senior analyst to conduct a C"
evaluation etlectively. MCES assists the analyst in forming a concise conclusion and
provides the manager with supporting data for decisionmaking. I he IF IN I'estbed is



























MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL
EVALUATION STRUCTURE (MCES)
Figure 2.8 MCES Modules and Output.
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in. IFFN TESTBED DESCRIPTION
A. THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
The Identification Friend, Foe or Neutral (IFFN) Testbed, comprised of a U.S.
Army and Air Force Joint Test Force at Kirtland Air Force Base, is investigating ways
to enhance the identification of friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft. A realistic
scenario used by the IFFN Joint Test Force forecasts that in future air battles our
tactical air defenses will be faced with sophisticated enemy fighters capable of engaging
our forces with beyond visual range (BVR) weapons The large number of enemy
aircraft with their use of low level tactics, high speeds, and Electronic Countermeasures
(ECM) challenges our air defense systems. The air defense system must be able to
identify and characterize the enemy attack and then direct sufficient force in time to
neutralize it. [Ref 9: p. 47]
Effective performance of the active air defense mission requires a capability to
correctly identify aircraft in a timely manner in order to facilitate the air defense
weapon system's ability to employ its weapons. This air defense process is done
through a complex arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications facilities
and procedures which form a C system. This requirement is particularly important in
the European theater where large numbers of friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft will
be part of the tactical air environment. In this environment, surface-to-air and air-to-
air weapon systems must operate in conditions beyond ranges where positive visual
identification can not be performed. The problem is aggravated when modern
electronic warfare (EW) threats, particularly those of the Warsaw Pact are considered.
Numerous studies have revealed that current electronic identification capabilities have
numerous problems including being too slow, poor at positively identifying enemies
and friends, insufficient range capability, and being subject to interference and
electronic countermeasures (ECM). The inability of air defense weapon systems
operators to accurately and rapidly discriminate friend, foe, or neutral aircraft results in
the ineffective use of these weapon systems. These problems have stimulated activity
within the US military and NATO to develop an effective NATO identification system.
The IFFN Testbed is a partial attempt by the United States at solving this air defense
problem. [Ref 3: p. I]
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The function of acquiring, correlating, fusing, and disseminating direct and
indirect IFFN information is an important part oi" air defense C". This IFFN
information serves as a basis for threat evaluation and engagement control. It is also
the function of air defense command and control to provide sulTicient identity
information, bearmg, and range to the allocated weapon system so that the weapon
system is able to acquire and engage a target with a high degree of confidence.
Acquisition and engagement information processed in a timely manner will permit
effective weapons employment. An IFFN system should also provide the necessary
information to allow passage of friendly and neutral targets.
B. THE AIR DEFENSE PROCESS
Identification is an integral step in the air defense C process and begins with
tasking and disposition of assets for air surveillance. The process continues through
detection of an intruding target and ends with a decision to engage the target with an
air defense weapons system. This process is characterized by complex relationships
between air surveillance. C~. and weapons systems. The targets will be identified as
friendly, neutral, hostile, or unknown. The hostile targets will be given dilTerent
priorities for engagement or may be engaged by other air defense assets. Air defense
C"" must have sufficient identity information to evaluate the intent of hostile targets
and assess the threat level posed by those individual targets. Air defense C must then
prioritize those targets for engagement, allocate the targets for engagement by specific
weapons systems, and aid a weapon system in acquiring that target without
endangering other targets. This must be done in a constantly changing air
environment where identity determination is a dynamic process involving people,
hardware, and software.
The classical sequence of air defense is detect, identify, engage, and destroy. This
classical sequence used by the IFFN Testbed is a simplification built from a number of
decisions and functions performed separately or mutually by C elements and air
defense weapon systems. Most of these functions and decisions are dependent upon
identification. Complicating this simple sequence is the fact that identification is both
a process and a decision. As a process, identification is a constant gathering and
correlating of information about a potential target from all sources of direct and
indirect identification information. This process is continuous up to the final
disposition of a target by the air defense system. As part of the identification process.
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the C^ system must correlate information from all sources and resolve any conflicts. As
a decision, an identification must be made before further action can occur, either
actively or by default. This decision is influenced by all the sensors available to the air
defense system, by the background intelligence on the air situation, and by the
operational procedures such as rules of engagement and weapons control status. The
decision-maker must either make or delegate the identification decision prior to the
engagement decision. [Ref 3: p. 8]
When performing the classical air defense sequence within an integrated air
defense system, the identification decision is also part of a larger process which is
performed by both C^ elements and air defense weapons systems. The process
becomes more complex when additional sources of direct and indirect information are
available and higher levels of conmiand and control participate. Individual weapon
systems are simultaneously performing detection, tracking, and identification as part of
their target acquisition function. They can be aided in performing this function by the
command and control system as it exercises its function of engagement control. When
operating autonomously, weapon systems are Umited to their organic detection,
tracking, and identification capability. The detection, tracking, and identification of
the entire system can be better used for target allocation and acquisition when the
command and control system provides engagement control in a centralized mode of
operation. Identification is a major factor in the performance of weapon systems to
defeat the enemy.
C. IFFN JOINT TESTBED CONCEPT
The Department of Defenses proposed partial solution to the NATO air defense
problem was the development of the IFFN Joint Testbed to gather analytic data on
the problem so that solutions could be formulated. The testbed v^ill assess baseline US
capabiUties within the NATO air defense C system to perform the IFFN function,
identify deficiencies in the performance of that function, and propose potential near-
term procedural and equipment modifications for further testing. One issue that vnll be
addressed by the IFFN Testbed is the indirect information process and how its use
may improve the performance of air defense systems to aid C and weapon systems
nodes. A testbed approach was taken so that a number of difTerent C strategies could
be tested without having to actually use the real equipment and weapons. The testbed
was envisioned to simulate as close as possible the real threat and the U.S. equipment
and procedures used in NATO. [Ref 3: pp. 1.2]
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The level of complexity of the air defense C system is enormous, thus, the IFFN
Test Force expended a large amount of effort in understanding general C" systems
before modeling the NATO air defense C system. A simulation testbed was ultmiately
chosen to evaluate the alternative air defense C" systems. The IFFN Test Force is
attempting to determine air defense identification measures of performance (MOPs)
and measures of eiTectiveness (MOEs) that will lead to the evaluation of the utility of
the dilFerent configurations of the air defense C architecture.
1. Baseline Architecture
The IFFN baseline architecture was formulated as a combination of hardware,
software, procedures, and doctrine that is planned to exist in the late 1980s. The
criteria will also be subjected to the projected Warsaw Pact 1987-1990 threat and is
consistent with Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of enemy capabilities and orders
of battle for that period. The timeframe chosen was a compromise between possible
near-term benefits and results which will have long range applicability. Certain
modifications that will be fielded in 1987 or beyond will be candidates for follow-on
tests using the IFFN testbed. [Ref 3: p. 3]
The testbed geographical area of interest is the NATO environment in which
US Army and .Air Force units operate jointly and under the control of associated
elements of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) System. The
IFFN testbed will focus on the battle management area of a representative NATO
Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) located in the Forth Allied Tactical Air Force
(4ATAF) area. Representation of key associated NATO command and control nodes
and information sources is required in the IFFN testbed. Figure 3.1 depicts the key
components of the IFFN Testbed. [Ref 3: pp. 3-6]
a. Command and Control Units
Command and control units are those representative units which direct or
control the beyond visual range (BVR) weapon systems and execute the active air
defense mission. The specific command centers that perform these C functions are:
Sector Operations Center (SOC), Control and Reporting Centers (CRC), Brigade Fire
Direction Centers (Bde FDC), and Battalion Fire Direction Centers (Bn FDC).
b. Information Sources
Sources which provide information for identification, target allocation, and
target acquisition in the air environment to the C units and weapon systems are



















Figure 3.1 IFFN Air Deren';c Structure.
<;ystems (N.AE^^'i. Special Information (intelligence) Systems (SIS), and other
information sources (i.e.. flight plans).
f. Weapon System's
\\"eapon s\stems are those representative BV'R weapon '^v'^tem'^ which are
operated by US forces. For the IFFN Testbed. the F-15. HAWK, and PATRIOT have
been selected as the representative BVR weapon systems. Due to resource constraints
on the IFFN Testbed. only these three weapon systems will be used.
2. Major Operational Issues
The testbed will generate and record the data necessary for analysis and
recommendations on IFFN issues There are three major operational issues considered
by the IFFN Testbed which are listed below.
a. Issue I
"What is the contribution of indirect identification information to the
ability of L'S air defense command and control systems operating in N.ATO to
correctly identify airborne targets, to use identification in performing target allocation,
and to aid subordinate air defense weapon systems in performing target acquisition?"
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[Ref. 10: p. 2]. Indirect ID information is that ID information that is not direct
electronic IFF returns. Indirect information usually refers to all other ID information
that arrives as a facility such as flight plans, area of operations, intelligence reports,
etc. However, direct ID information once passed to another facility also becomes
indirect ID information. Satisfying the first major operational issue will provide a
baseline assessment of the expected identification performance of a representative
NATO air defense system operating in the 4ATAF area. Studying the first issue will
also provide a fuller understanding of the relationship between the identification
performance of the C system and the performance of the overall active air defense
mission.
b. Issue 2
"What are the deficiencies in air defense system use (collection, formation,
dissemination, and use) of indirect identification information for which solutions are
not currently planned?" [Ref 10: p. 2]. The second major operational issue will
identify weaknesses in the identification process and allow for a qualitative comparison
of those weaknesses identified during testing. Potential corrective actions for these
identified deficiencies can then be developed. These recommended corrective actions
could take the form of changes in doctrine, procedures, system software,
communications connectivity, or addition of new data sources, or various combinations
of these solutions.
c. Issue 3
"What near-term procedural and equipment modifications should be
recommended to overcome deficiencies?" [Ref 10: p. 2]. This issue will address
productive near-term solutions to the IFFN problem.
3. Hybrid Approach
Two major options were considered during feasibility studies when developing
the test concept. Field exercises and computer-based simulation were both evaluated
and compared. A hybrid approach was ultimately selected which permits the use of the
best of both options. The concept is centered around live operators using actual
tactical hardware and accepted simulations of hardware and software called Live
Participating Units (LPUs). Real-time computer models stimulate the LPUs as well as
represent the background workload for these units. This man-in-the-loop simulation
will be carried out through all the tests. Since the IFFN Joint Test Force developed a
hybrid simulation testbed composed of simulated participating units, there was no
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requirement for live operation of aircraft, weapons, radars, nor field deployment of
weapons and command and control systems. To implement this test concept a
distributed testbed was established at a central facility at Kirtland Air Force Base, New
Mexico. The testbed at Kirtland generates and distributes the tactical scenario,
controls test execution, and monitors the response of geographically distributed Patriot
and Hawk LPUs at the Army Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss, Texas.
A realistic scenario environment was necessary to ensure realistic and accurate
results. The combination of a few high fidelity LPUs responding to simulated and
manned units was determined to be an excellent method to simulate the
interdependency and interaction of air defense units. The IFFN Test Force conducted
a substantial testbed certification elTort with joint service participation to validate and
calibrate testbed performance against joint and combined field exercises for the first
test series. Further credibility and validity tests will be made after each test series.
4. Models
The IFFN models that were developed can be categorized as interactive or
noninteractive. The interactive models react dynamically to perceived changes in the
air battle situation. They may receive inputs such as data link messages from the other
models or LPUs and may initiate messages in response to this input or their own. The
output of these models is dependent on the specific dynamics of the air battle. The
applications of the interactive models for the IFFN testbed are: sensor models, missile
models, and dynamically controlled aircraft models. Examples include radar, electronic
IFF, Patriot SAMs, and fighter and attack aircraft platforms. [Ref. 10: p. 10]
The IFFN noninteractive models do not react to the air battle dynamics.
They are less complex models and simply generate selected messages and actions at
preprogrammed times according to a script prepared prior to the test. The models are
considered suitable for simulating those facilities that do not dynamically interact with
the identification process, but do provide orders, procedures, and other information on
a one-way basis such as certain higher echelon planning facilities. Noninteractive
models will also be used to simulate aircraft following programmed fiight profiles which
are not automatically reactive to the air battle environment. The Sector Operations
Center (SOC) is an example of a noninteractive model used in the IFFN Testbed
simulation. Examples of weapon platforms are transport, patrol, and tanker aircraft.
[Ref. 10: p. 14]
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D. TESTBED PHASES
In order to niininiize technical and program risks, a phased testbed acquisition
was adopted. The test approach is based on seven test series. The series will consi'^t
of weapons systems, command and control systems, and associated data links. One of
eight planned phased simulations has been completed. The following is a description
and list of the systems involved. [Ref 10: pp. 3,4]
1. Test Series 1
Series 1 tests the identification performance of a representative US Army
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System which is the PATRIOT fire unit. The systems
tested are:
1. PATRIOT Fire Unit (FU), and
2. PATRIOT Air Defense Information Language (PADIL).
2. Test Series 2
Series 2 adds the PATRIOT'S first echelon of command and control, the
Battalion Fire Direction Center. The systems tested are:
1. PATRIOT FU,
2. PATRIOT Battalion Fire Direction Center (Bn FDC), and
3. PADIL.
3. Test Series 3
Series 3 adds the next level of C
,
the Brigade Fire Direction Center. The
systems tested are:
1. PATRIOT FU,
2. PATRIOT Bn FDC.
3. PATRIOT Brigade Fire Direction Center (Bde FDC),
4. PADIL, and the
5. Army Tactical Data Link-1 (ATDIL 1).
4. Test Series 4
Series 4 tests only the USAF's fighter-intercepters, the F-15 . The system
tested is the F-15 "Eagle" Intercepted
5. Test Series 5
Series 5 adds associated USAF C nodes and information sources to the F-15
system. The systems tested are:
1. F-15,
2. USAF Control and Reporting Post/ Message Processing Center (CRP MPC).
3. NATO Airborne Early Warning System (NE-3A),
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4. Special Information System (SIS).
5. Tactical Digital Information Link - A (TADIL-A). and
6. TADIL-B.
6. Test Series 6
Series 6 will integrate the Army systems from Series 1-3 with the USAF
systems from Series 4 and 5. This will now be a joint operations test. The systems
tested are:
1. PATRIOT FU.
2. PATRIOT Bn FDC,










7. Test Series 7
Series 7 will add a CRC to form the total system to be tested. The systems to
be tested are:
1. PATRIOT FU,
-> PATRIOT Bn FDC,












E. IFFN TEST CELL MATRIX
The simulation will be conducted using a controlled variable approach. Different
simulation test cells are used in which some variables are held constant while others are
left to fluctuate and eventually lead to the determination of the variables' impact on
the C" system. The basic test structure considers both a fully integrated air defense
system and several subsets of the system. The different configurations allow different
variables to be isolated to establish their contribution to the particular air defense C"
system. Each trial will be run with a constant measurement volume of a prescribed
radius with only predetermined variables changed. The measurement volume is the
area covered by the air defense unit or weapon system. The test cells of the matrix are
used to generate comparative data under various environmental conditions. Figure 3.2
represents the basic test matrix often test cells used by the IFFN testbed.
Data items are collected from collection messages that are generated by data
events during the simulation. Data events are events that take place during the
simulation such as information arrival and actions performed by the air defense C
system nodes. For Test Series 2, there are fourteen data events that are collected from
each test cell simulation to be used in the calculation of the MOEs and MOPs with
other data events used for deficiency analysis. All MOEs and MOPs are divided into
two groups of probability measures and distribution measures. These measures are not
necessarily measures of the variables themselves but are intended to be measures of the
results of the variables impact on the C system. [Ref 11: p. 20]
F. MEASURES
General categories of measures were sought to derive values that would
eventually lead to discrimination among the different C systems. The simulation can
not completely characterize the performance of the fully deployed air defense systems,
so absolute conclusions about the performance of the air defense systems are nearly
impossible. With this shortcoming in mind, measures of the relative change in the
performance effect of the variable under varying conditions will be used when only
large and significant differences are noted. This means that a low confidence level will
be used when analyzing the data. Figure 3.3 depicts the general approach taken by the

































• ACP's (Airspace Control Procedures)
• Q&A IFF (Question and Answer Electronic IFF)
. FU (Fire Unit)
• IID (Indirect Identification)
• AUTO ( Autonomous)

















Figure 3.3 IFFN Test Design Approach.
1. Test Series 2 Objectives
There were originally six objectives formulated from the three issues for Test
Series 2 that eventually led to the formulation of the IFFN Testbed measures. These
objectives are listed below without the more detailed sub-objectives for each objective.
1. Objective 1 - Assess and contrast the performance of the PATRIOT battalion
under centralized and decentralized control.
2. Objective 2 - .Assess the impact of chansine and removing Airspace Control
Procedures (.ACPs) on the operational perTormance of tTie centralized and
decentralized battalion and autonomous fire unit.
3. Objective 3 - Determine the value and impact of perfect ID and communication
system performance on PATRIOT baitahon performance.
4. Objective 4 - Evaluate the impact of various changes in direct and indirect ID
perlormance and interaction.
5. Objective 5 - .Assess the influence of the fire unit ID function on the ablitv of
the PATRIOT battalion to perform its functions.
6. Objective 6 - Identify and subjectively evaluate any PATRIOT operational
dehciencies noted during testing. [Ref II: pp. 2.1,2.2j
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2. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
There are three primarv' MOE areas formulated for all the test series. The
IFFN Testbed originally identified three functions that were performed in the air
defense process: identification, target allocation, and target acquisition. [Ref 3: pp.
17.18]
a. MOEs for the Identification Function
These MOEs will describe how well the weapons and C systems are able
to identify or recognize airborne objects and assign them to appropriate identification
categories.
b. MOEs for the Target Allocation Function
These MOEs will relate identification information used by C systems to
allocate air defense weapons against hostile aircraft and prevention of misallocation of
weapons against friendly aircraft.
c. MOEs for the Target Acquisition Function
These MOEs provide the measures relating indirect identification
information to the weapons systems. Target acquisition provided by the command and
control structure to the weapons systems is a part of these MOEs.
d. MOE List
The MOEs for Test Series 2 that measure the needed information for the
JC evaluation issues are listed in Table 2 [Ref 11: p. D25]. The letter "P" identifies
probability measures while the letter "R" signifies range distributions and the letter "T"
represents time distributions.
3. Measures of Performance (MOP)
Measures of Performance (MOP) for the IFFN Testbed were submeasures of
the air defense functions and therefore subsets of the MOEs. An example is the
probability that a passed ID is correct which is a submeasure of MOE 3. probability of
identification of an aircraft. The MOPs for Test Series 2 that were determined to
measure the needed quantities or quaUties to resolve the six stated objectives are listed
in Table 3 [Ref 11: pp. D23,D24] with corresponding MOE number references.
4. Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
Measures of Force Effectiveness are global measures that determine how
effectively the mission is accomplished. Target hits and damage assessments were not




MOE# MOE MOE DEFINITION
1. P(D/V) Probability of detecting an aircraft
given that it has entered a system
measurement volume.
2. P(T/D) Probability of tracking an aircraft,
given that it has entered a system s
measurement volume and has been detected.
3. P( I/T) Probability of identification of an
aircraft- given that it has entered
a system s measurement volume and has
been tracked.
4. P(A/I) Probability of allocation of an
aircraft- given that it has entered
a system s measurement volume and has
been identified.
5. P(E/A) Probability of engagement of an
aircraft- given that it has entered
a system s measurement volume and
has been allocated.
Probability of engaging an aircraft.
Probability of engaging a friedly
aircraft.
Probability of engaging a neutral
aircraft.
Probability of engaging a hostile
aircraft.
Distribution of times elapsed between
detection and engagement.
Probability of engaging a hostile
aircraft before it fires
a missile or drops ordnance.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to






























Distribution of ranges from aircraft
to detection unit at time of detection.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
FSCL at time of detection.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
tracking unit at the time the track was
established.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
FSCL at time of tracking.
Distribution of times elapsed between
detection and tracking.
Probabilities of identifying an aircraft
as category X ( friend^ neutral^ or
hostile)
<
given that its true identity
is Y (friend, neutral, or hostile) and
that it has been detected.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
identifying unit at time of ID.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
FSCL at time of ID.
Distribution of times elapsed between
tracking and ID.
Probability that a passed ID is correct.
Probability that an ID conflict is
resolved while the aircraft is still in
the weapon system s measurement volume.
Distribution of times elapsed between
receipt and retransmission of ID
information by a C2 node.
Probability that an ID includes track
amplification information.
Probabilities of allocating an aircraft,
given that its true identity is Y
(friend, neutral, or hostile) and that
It has been identified.
R(A)
R( FA)
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
allocated unit at time of allocation.
Distribution of ranges from aircraft to




4) T( lA) Distribution of times elapsed between ID
and allocation.
5) P(E/YA) Probabilities of engaging an aircraft,
given that its true identity is Y
ffriend, neutral, or hostile) and
that it has been allocated.
5) R(E) Distribution of ranges from aircraft to
engaging unit at time of engagement.
5) T( AE) Distribution of times elapsed between
allocating and engagement.
G. ANALYSIS OF DATA
1. Explorator>' Data Screening
The test data results are first examined and screened for outliers and to verify
underlying assumptions such as normality, independence, constant variances, and zero
mean. Various methods are used to statistically check the data. Data screening
involves a number of methods listed below. [Ref II: pp. D37-D42]
a. Box and line plots
Box and line plots are used for time and range distributions. The box or
line plot allows pictorial presentation of a set of distribution measures for a set of trials
or number of test cells.
b. Frequency distributions (Histograms)
Histograms are used also for time and range distributions. These show
visual evidence of normality as well as extreme outlying values.
c. Scatterplots
Scatterplots are used for time versus range plots distributions. Bivariate
scatterplots provide a visualization of the relationship between two continuous
variables.
d. Normal probability plots
Probability plots are used to determine probability types and fits. Normal
probability plots provide visual evidence of the difference between a given distribution
and a Gaussian distribution.
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2. Data Analysis
The data analysis that follows screening is listed below.
a. Paired T Tests
Means are tested using this test. The assumptions concerning the
underlying populations are that they are independent samples and the variances are the
same. If they are not, then F tests are used.
b. Analysis of Variance (AIVOVA)
ANOVA allows inferences to be formulated about differences in "treatment
effects" brought about by the test variables which are controlled from cell to cell.
Inferences are made by estimating how much of the variability in test data is explained
by the effect of the test variables and how much is due to random error.
c. Hypothesis Testing
The ANOVA provides a basis for the formal hypothesis test that the trial;
cell means or specific subgroup means are all equal.
J. Contingency Table Analysis
This analysis is sometimes called row by column (RC) table analysis. This
test is used when more than two outcomes are possible, a frequent occurrence among
the test cells. Each 2x2 contingency table analysis will be performed for comparing
probability measures from cell to cell on as many of the measures as practicable.
e. Regression
Regression analysis determines the statistical relationship between one or
more independent variables and a dependent variable. Curve fitting is accomplished by
regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable.
/. Correlative analysis
The relationship between the independent and dependent variables or
causality is determined by correlation analysis. This analysis determines what
proportion of the variation of the dependent variables can be attributed to the
relationship with the independent variable.
g. Standard Normal Theory Approximations
These series of tests are used to determine what type of probability
distribution exists and how good that data fits that distribution.
h. Deficiency analysis
After the data has been checked and analyzed, the causes of the differences
in the C configurations are proposed and examined. The objective is to find the
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underlying cause or reason behind the difTerences. This could he helpful to
decisionmakers in allocating limited resources to dilTerent C" configurations.
[Ref. 11: pp. Dil-D29]
H. IFFN PROGRESS SUMMARY
It is evident that the IFFN Testbed has made progress in its attempt to evaluate
the NATO air defense C system. The IFFN air defense problem is definitely complex
and the IFFN Testbed has understandably committed large amounts of resources to
the problem. The Testbed is a good concept for an experimental design to test
competing C systems since all of the alternative systems can not be tested using actual
equipment due to resource constraints or present C configuration limitations. The
IFFN Test Force has been careful to insure that the testbed is credible. Only Test
Series 1 has been completed with Test Series 2 to begin in March 1987.
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IV. PROPOSED iMCES APPLICATION TO THE IFFN TESTBED
A. INTRODUCTION
Primar>' research into the application of MCES as an evaluation tool for the
IFFN Testhed was undertaken by Major Patrick Gandee, U.S. Air Force, when he was
a Naval Postgraduate School student. Two Military' Operational Research Society
(MORS) teams also contributed to the proposed MCES application during two MORS
conferences. The bulk of Major Gandee's and the MORS teams' work with the IFFN
Testbed is included in Major Gandee's thesis [Ref 12] and later refmements by Major
Gandee as a stall member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Command and Control Systems
Directorate [Ref 9: pp. 49-58]. Dr. Ricki Sweet, who was Major Gandee's thesis
advisor, provided the then current MCES methodology guidance. This application
study was also supported by the Naval Postgraduate School and the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Stall. Major Gandee received assistance from IFFN Testbed personnel
including Colonel Dave Archino, Director, and Vlajor Mike Grey, Chief, Operational
Analysis Section. These IFFN Testbed personnel also participated in the MCES
application to the IFFN Testbed. The following application is mainly taken from
Major Gandee's thesis, notes, and briefings along with Major Greys notes and
conversations plus research of IFFN Test Force test plans.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Utilizing the first MCES module, the MORS team and Major Gandee
reformulated the IFFN problem which was a subset of the air defense C process
problem. Within air defense C^, the emphasis was on allocating multiple hostile
targets to weapons systems for engagement. Major Gandee understood that this air
defense C^ process description should consist of a complete set of battle management
functions which were needed to direct the weapon systems to perform the air defense
mission. Other issues considered by Major Gandee in the first module were the
different evaluation levels and analysis objectives. Issues such as procedural control
and centralized and decentralized control were also researched and reviewed. Figure
























Figure 4.1 IFFN Application of MCES Module 1.
The IFFN Testbed had focused its analysis on specific concerns of Army, Air
Force, NATO, and DOD decision makers regarding the role o[ identification as it
contributes to the effectiveness of the air defense C"^ process. The major concern
expressed by the IFFN Joint Testbed was the determination of how the programnied
C^ system and weapon systems would operate together. The IFFN mission and its
environment (friends, foe. neutral, weather) had already been specified prior to Major
Gandee's MCES application. The friendly weapon systems were limited to SAMs and
fighters with beyond visual range (BVR) munitions. A conventional threat scenario
was already chosen by the IFFN Test Force so that stress on the C" system could be
affected by varying traffic volume, ECM jamming to radars, communication jamming
and var\'ing weather conditions. [Ref 1: p. 65]
The final step addressed by Major Gandee in this module was the analysis
objective. The overall air defense C analysis objective was reformulated by the
January 1985 MORS workshop from IFFN issues. The analysis objective [Ref 2: p. 1]
was to determine:
How effective is the air defense C^ svslem in the central region in Europe in
providing decisionmakers the means to assess and employ air defense assets to
meet overall mission objectives?
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Major Gandee realized that identification can be afiected by the presence of a physical
entity or an asset like the airborne command post or by procedures such as those used
for passing identification information. The IFFN analysis objective was eventually
expanded by Major Gandee to determine:
1. How etTective is the C process when the C2 structure and its attendant
changes in tactics and procedures is varied.
2. How effective is the C^ process when physical entities are added or lost.
[Ref. 2: p. 3]
The details of formulating the analysis objective involved interaction between the
decisionmakers, operational users and analysts. [Ref. 12: pp. 21-23]
C. C- SYSTEM BOUNDING
In the next module, the bounding of the C system of interest was confirmed by
Major Gandee from previous IFFN efforts. Figure 4.2 lists the condensed results of
implementing Module 2 for the IFFN Testbed. Physical entities were identified and
bounded and Figure 4.2 depicts the successful application of the "onion skin" idea.
Alternative organizational structures were determined and hierarchal charts formulated.
.Again, much of this had been accomplished earlier at the IFFN Testbed but not by
using specific MCES methodology. The application of this module confirmed that the
IFFN C" bounding was sound. [Ref. 12: pp. 21-26]
D. C- PROCESS DEFINITION
1 . Air Defense C Process Functions
In this module. Major Gandee defined the C process functions of the
distributed C2 air defense system. The air defense C process functions were
determined to be: detect (D), track (T), identify (ID), assess threat (TA), assign
weapon (WA), allocate weapon (AW), and weapons monitor and control (C). Figure
1 2
4.3 depicts the air defense C process. These air defense C process functions were
mapped to the modified Lawson's C^ process model to ensure that all C functions
had been considered and Figure 4.4 depicts that translation. [Ref 12: pp. 32-37]
These air defense functions represented what the air defense C system and
weapon system are required to accomplish together to perform the mission. For the
IFFN Testbed application, a process function was added to Lawson's generic C loop
and the plan function was eliminated. Lawson's plan function did not correspond to a
real-time activity during the IFFN execution phase, however, non-real time plans such
as airspace control procedures (ACPs) and rules of engagement (ROE) are a part of
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Figure 4.4 Mapping of Air Defense C Functions.
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2. Distributed C'' Process Interface
Since the IFFN Testbed was dealing with a distributed C system, the
determination of C" process function boundaries was sometimes complex. Major
Gandee discovered that in a distributed command and control system there are three
distinct processes that will aflect the overall performance of the C^ system; intelligence,
crosstell (coordination), and execution level C^ processes. [Ref. 12: pp. 38,39]
a. XTELL Process
A separate Crosstell (XTELL) process provides a way to share target
information for the purpose of improving the overall picture of the environment and
improving the accuracy of information. This is especially important for identification
(ID) information in the air defense application where command centers are
geographically dispersed. Individual command centers may develop definitive ID
information which can be used by other command centers who have a tactical
advantage or resources to engage the target. The XTELL process is accomplished
through three functions of Crosstell (XTELL), Track Correlation (TC), and ID
Conflict Resolution (IDC). The XTELL process is represented in Figure 4.5 with its
C" process interface.
The XTELL function of the XTELL process is the transfer and receipt of
information via data link with some rules or filters. These rules specify where
information is to be sent and what information will be received. The Track Correlation
(TC) function resolves location and track numbering disagreements in the C" system.
The ID Conflict Resolution (IDC) function resolves conflicts that may arise in the
identification process between different C nodes. At some nodes, this IDC function is
a fusion process while at other nodes it is a decision process.
Figure 4.6 represents the XTELL process in a lateral relationship. This
lateral relationship represents adjoining units of the same level passing coordinating
information between them. This information is then fused and correlated. A vertical
or hierarchal XTELL relationship can also be present in distributed C^ systems. The
vertical XTELL process is similar to the lateral relationship except that now the
coordinating information flows between the hierarchical related units. The fusion and
correlation of the identity and track information may be diflerent than that in the
lateral relationship since the higher level unit will usually have more voice in resolving
conflicts of information. The alternative C systems have various configurations of









Figure 4.5 XTELL Process Functions and C~ Process Interface.
b. ISTELL Process
An Intelligence (INTELL) process aids decisionmakers throughout the C"
system in forming perceptions of enemy capabilities and intentions. The INTELL
process is accomplished through four functions of Sense (S), Process (P). Intelligence
Correlation (IC). and Assess (A). [Ref. 12: pp. 39-42]
The function which collects data necessary to describe and forecast the
environment is termed the Sense (S) function. The function that transforms data into
information about the enemy forces' disposition and actions is termed the Process (P)
function. The Intelligence Correlation (IC) function correlates intelligence information
with track and ID information. The .Assess {A) function is performed when
information is examined and patterns uncovered that indicate the actions or intentions
of the enemy. The Assess function is also performed when patterns are utilized to
forecast possible future changes in environment. Figure 4.7 graphically depicts the
INTELL and C"^ process along with the XTELL process.
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Figure -4.6 Lateral XTELL Process.
c. Execution Level C' Process
The INTELL and XTELL processes support the Command and Control
Process. The C~ process can be viewed at a level which directly controls weapon
systems and at a higher echelon which coordinates the efTorts of C" processes which
direct the weapon systems. Since the IFFN Testbed simulates the NATO air defense
system which is geographically distributed, the C process included a netting of the
separate command centers through the XTELL process. The INTELL process will
also be interfaced with some of the process functions. The interfacing of the XTELL,
INTELL, and C processes together by communication links, protocols, operational
procedures determined the overall C architecture. Figure 4.8 lists the major actions
completed in Module 3. [Ref. 12: pp. 44-46]
E. INTEGRATION OF SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONS
Prior to developing measures, Gandee felt that a model or architecture that
described the system was definitely needed. When Gandee attempted to establish an
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Figure 4.8 IFFN Application of MCES Module 3.
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architecture for the air defense C" system, he found that he needed a number of
actions not listed in the then current MCES methodology. The methodology for
interfacing all the processes into an architecture was not covered completely in the
original version of MCES. The developers of MCES adopted this idea of the
integration of system elements and functions into an architecture to support the C^
evaluation.
1. Structures
Information flow through the air defense C process functions was used by
Gandee to derive a natural hierarchical relationship between the individual C"
functions in the form of an information flowchart. Later command organizations and
equipment and communications alignment were also related to form a organizational
structure chart. [Ref 9: p. 54]
Major Gandee needed a methodology that documented this internal
processing and described how the information is input to and output from the function.
There are a number of methods available to formulate and describe the internal
processing of C functions. In this module, a specific software design technique, Data
Flow-Oriented Design [Ref. 7: pp. 99-115] was used to integrate the system elements
and functions of the C system. Thus, this input, output relationship could form a
description of the internal information flow between separate process functions as
required to perform the mission. The end result was a "structure" for a particular
version of the C^ system. The MCES definition of "structure" states that structure
identifies the arrangement and interrelationships of physical entities, procedures,
protocols, concepts of operation, and information patterns. [Ref 12: p. 48]
a. Data Flow-Oriented Design
In the first step, each C process function was examined and the data
flowing through the function defined. A graphic representation of this process is
termed a data flow diagram (DFD) and they describe the input/output relationships
>
that exist between the C functions. Figure 4.9 depicts a data flow diagram (DFD) tor
an "execution level" C process at a single command node. The DFD's were also
applied to interface the INTELL, XTELL, and Force processes with the C"- process in
the distributed IFFN C^ system. Major Gandee described how that information How
linked those separate processes into an architecture of the complete C or combat













4 PRIORITIZE FOE TARGETS
5 ASSIGN TARGETS TO WEAPONS
6 ALLOCATE TARGET TO UNIT
7 MONITOR ENGAGEMENTS
Figure 4.9 Air Defense Single Node Data Flow Diagram.
56
b. Transform Analysis
In the next step, the C" process as a whole was reviewed and a transform
analysis performed on the DFD to determine the C^ process or transform center.
Using this flow of information into and out of each function, a transform analysis was
conducted to determine the information transforming process center where information
flowed in and were the information was transformed into an output in the form of
control information. A C^ function is analogous to a data flow transform. An
example is shown in Figure 4.9 which depicts the Assess Threat function as the C~
process or transform center of the basic air defense process where the main perception
is formed. Information flows in to formulate this perception and is termed the afferent
branch. Information flows out in terms of decisions based on this perception and
constitutes control flow and is termed the efferent branch. Structurally, this Assess
Threat function subordinates the others and it was designated as the C process center.
A structure chart was derived from this transform analysis which shows the overall
structural relationships between each C process function. This process center was
then used to establish the structural hierarchy between C process functions. This
hierarchical relationship between C2 process functions was presented as a structure
chart. All these C functions can be potentially performed in a single node or be
distributed between different nodes.
After the functional structure is formed, the people and their equipment
can then be matched to that structure. Major Gandee's gave an example of the battle
commander performing the Assess Threat function supported by the identification
officer. The commander also has subordinate weapon assignment officers who
implement his decisions to attack the most important targets. Major Gandee found
that the equipment consoles can be matched to this structure as capabilities to assign
targets or control weapons can be implemented by configuring consoles to address
their output in accordance with the specified "structure". [Ref. 12: pp. 48-50]
c. Null Process Concept
Under some operational concepts, C^ process functions can be distributed
between command nodes such as Brigade and Battalion FDCs or between command
nodes and weapon systems such as the CRC and fighter. The C2 process functions can
be divided. Such arrangements are often temporary and unique to the particular
version of the C system. Major Gandee developed the concept of a null process to
differentiate between the C process functions when they are distributed. For example,
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the Brigade FDC allocates to the Battalion FDC and the Battalion FDC allocates the
weapon system. Only one C" process can direct a weapon system although its
decisions may be influenced by information coming from other C^ processes. Influence
can come in the form of an indirect ID or priorities from a higher echelon. Each
command node can potentially perform all C functions to direct force actions in the
environment. Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 depict the distribution of C and force
functions between a Battalion FDC and SAM batter\' for two differing operational
concepts of centralized and decentralized control. A function can be null at a facility
due to a physical limitation such as the null Detect function at the Battalion for lack of
organic radar or due to a redistribution of decision functions to reflect a difierent
operational doctrine.
With these techniques, the C system architecture was changed to show
relationships between "physical entities", and "processes", to produce a "structure".
This structure was altered to reflect different operational concepts which form the
different versions of the C system. There should be a different structure for each
ahernative system. Figure 4.10 is a good example of the structure of a battalion
employing centralized control of its batter>' fire units and is different than the structure
in Figure 4. II of a Battalion employing decentralized control of its batter\' fire units.
In these illustrations, the null functions are not enclosed by a box. (Ref. 12: pp. 51-53]
d. Procedures
Procedures are utilized in the internal processing within C functions. For
instance, some IFFN issues deal with ID value of air space control procedures. These
rules or procedures are specified externally but used internally within the ID function
to determine ID. These rules, when combined with other sources for ID into some
decision loop or algorithm, affect the internal "structure" of the ID function. If these
procedures are taken away then the decision loop (internal structure) is changed.
Major Gandee used a design technique which provides a module description that
explodes each C function to define the internal processing and the coupling to other
C or force functions. In this approach the functions were related to an appropriate
physical entity prior to determining relevant measures of performance (MOP),
measures of effectiveness (MOE), and measures of force effectiveness (MOFE).
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Figure 4.11 Decentralized Control of a Battalion Fire Unit.
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2. Architecture
The MCES defines "architecture" as an description of a integrated set of
systems whose physical entities, structure and functions are coherently related. The
architecture provides a representation which will eventually lead to the ability to
measure the C^ system response and the effectiveness of directing forces to accomplish
the mission. The Integration of the system elements of man and machine with the
process functions will eventually form an overall architecture that can be used by
analysts to evaluate the C^ system. The final step is to formulate a overall C* system
architecture that will incorporate all the different version structures internally. The last
step in completing the architecture was to identify what physical entites performed the
individual process functions and what connectivity linked the functions together. This
established a single architecture represented as an overall structure chart. The final
form of the architecture includes the process description and system elements
performing the processes arranged in a structural framework. Additional modules to
the structure chart provided documentation for equipment, personnel requirements,
and connectivity in the necessary detail.
The general C architecture will remain unchanged but the structure variations
would be represented by the different version's unique information fiow. An air
defense example was illustrated by Major Gandee to describe how structures can differ
internally in a C system architecture. This illustration involved air defense operators
located in front of consoles. Equipment consoles could be configured in various ways
to aid the operator in performing certain functions and allow the output to be
transfered to other consoles. The operator would be aided in his ability to process
information and communicate it through a machine structure that parallels an
organizational structure. The general C architecture would be the same but there
would be unique structures utilizing the equipment and personnel differently.
[Ref 12: pp. 48-50]
Major Gandee listed three advantages for utilizing an architectural
representation of the C system. Major Gandee found that the C process can be
broken down into separate functions and appropriate attributes defined more
systematically than previous brute force or exhaustive listing methods. For example,
the major Identify function attributes were relatively easy to determine as accuracy,
timeliness and completeness. The second advantage of an architectural representation
is the cabability of defining where a measure should be taken to measure a certain
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function. Certain operational concepts have the same function performed at dilfcrent
nodes or levels. Therefore, measurements must take place where the function is bemg
conducted. For example, the Allocate Weapons {AW) function is performed at the
Battalion level in the Centralized Control mode. Figure 4.10 . but is performed at the
Fire Unit level. Figure 4.11 , in the Decentralized Control mode. The Battalion just
monitors the Allocate Weapons function activities in the Decentralized Control mode.
If an accurate architecture depicts the actual operations of the C" system, these
relationships are clearly delineated. A third ver\" important reason for architectural
representation is its capability to graphically depict the C" system and weapon systems
and highlight appropriate operational issues. [Ref. 9: pp. 54o6]
Major Gandee's work did result in the addition of more objectives and
ultimately additional measures to Test Series 2 as new relationships were uncovered.
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Figure 4.12 IFFN Application of MCES Module 4.
F. SPECIFICATIONS OF MEASURES
Major Gandee used a different approach than the IFFN Testbed when
determining the measures needed to evaluate the competing versions of the air defense
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C" systems. Instead of moving from issues to objectives to measures to answer those
objectives. Major Gandee examined the information flow and bounded system elements
to determine which measures were needed. Figure 4.13 graphically depicts Major
Gandees approach for determining measures for the air defense C" system. In this
figure, the shaded area represents the functional air defense C system. The MOPs are
measures of each function within the C system. Each function is dependent on those
functions preceding it, so the MOPs are conditional probability measures with
additional range and timeliness measures not shown. MOEs measure how well the C^
system performed all its functions as a whole and is measured outside of the C"- system.
1. MCES Test Series 2 Issues
Major Gandee illustrated some of the issues he considered concerning
identification, centralized control, and network connectivity for Test Series 2. Focusing
upon such issues lead to the differentiation among the alternative architectures.
Issue 1: Will centralized control at the Battalion manage the missile resources
better bv spreading the fire power more evenly over subordinate units and over
time?
Issue 2: Under what traffic volume conditions can centralized control be
handled without degradation?
Issue 3: If the data links (XTELL process) carrv information on which targets
have been allocated for engagement, can SAM batteries operate in a self-
deconllicting manner conserving missile resources?
Issue 4: Given decentralized control and self-deconflictine doctrine, is a fullv
connected data network required to prevent a single point failure due to the
possible destruction of a Battalion Firing Unit?
Issue 5: Will the XTELL network supply the most complete ID to the other
SAM batteries when their ID equipment becomes inoperable? [Ref. 9: pp.
57.58]
2. MCES Measures
Major Gandee's first four issues for Test Series 2 were sensitive to structural
changes. Major Gandee suggested possible efTiciency and coordination measures which
would reflect the probability of a target being engaged by more than one unit due to
lack of coordination. The fifth issue of identification questioned whether a network
could increase individual unit identification capabilities. This could be accompUshed by
supplying more complete ID information from other units which formulate the ID
information. Major Gandee suggested that an ID accuracy measure could be used to
compare the accuracy of an ID formulated at an organic unit and the ID information
which passes over the network to other units as a system ID. Examples of generic
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Figure 4.13 MCES Approach for Determining Measures.
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Other possible measures suggested by Major Gandee were fusing measures that
measured the ability of units to accept and fuse system ID mformation with its own
organic ID information to improve the ID accuracy m time to use it elTcctively. Figure
4.14 represents the major measures recommended by Major Gandee during the MCES



























Figure 4.14 IFFN Application of MCES Module 5.
G. iMCES APPLICATION SUMMARY
Major Gandee's proposed application of MCES to the IFFN basically stopped at
Module 5, Specification of Measures, due to time constraints and the delay of Test
Series 2 execution. As a result, the MCES data generation and aggregation and
interpretation modules were not evaluated for Test Series 2 by Major Gandee. The
MCES methodology provided a evaluation methodology to assist the IFFN Test Force
in its evaluation of the air defense C^ problem. The MCES approach of systematically
outlining the physical entities, structure, and C process functions insured that all
evaluation areas were covered. MCES has definitely helped in highlighting the
functional measures that have beea overlooked in previous C evaluations. The
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distributed functions are required to characterize the coordination and intelligence
sharing of distributed C" systems. There are diHerent levels of these distributed
functions and the C^ structures can become ver\' complex. MCES's distributed
functions did assist in describing these complexities. The MCES concept of using a
model or architecture to establish a baseline with alternative structures to represent the
competing C~ systems was very useful in developing measures to differentiate between
them. Understanding the system has to take place before attempting to measure its
utility and to uncover which variables are responsible. The MCES approach appeared
to be detailed and complete and new relationships were uncovered by Major Gandee.
MCES provided the IFFN C^ analysts with a theoretical framework for determining
the utility of a C^ system. The VICES application did assist the IFFN Testbed.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE IFFN TESTBED AND MCES APPROACHES
A. FEEDBACK TO THE DECISION-MAKER
Major Grey. Chief. Operational Analysis section. IFFN Joint Test Force, and the
IFFN testbed director. Colonel Dave Archino. participated in the MORS workshop
and later incorporated some of the MCES ideas into its test plans. Major Gandee
visited the IFFN Testbed, conducted his research, and made his MCES application to
the IFFN Testbed with the full assistance of Major Grey. Major Gandees proposed
application of MCES to the IFFN basically stopped at Module 5. Specification of
Measures, due to time constraints and the delay of Test Series 2 execution. As a
result, the MCES data generation and aggregation and interpretation modules were not
evaluated for Test Series 2 by Major Gandee. Due to even another delay in the
execution of Test Series 2 until March 1987, the final results were not evaluated during
the conduct of this thesis as was originally planned.
Test Series 1 was planned and conducted without the aid of MCES. The early
planning stages of Test Series 2 had been completed before the MCES application
started. However, when new or better ideas were developed in the MCES application,
some of these ideas were added to the Test Series 2 test plan. A strict comparison of
the IFFN Testbed produced Test Series 1 results to Test Series 2 would not be valid
due to the mixed participation in Test Series 2. In the evaluation of Test Series 2. it
was sometimes dilTicult to determine exactly what part of the test plan was attributable
to MCES or the IFFN Testbed. In almost all cases, MCES at least confirmed earlier
IFFN Testbed planning. In some cases, MCES provided new insights that were
responsible for a better test plan.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Although the problem formulation was completed earlier by the IFFN Test
Force, .MCES was used to verify that the correct steps were taken. As previously
noted, the analysis objective was expanded by the MCES application. The problem
formulation revolved around the air defense problem and not around how to build a
credible testbed to evaluate competing air defense C systems. The IFFN Testbed
itself was a system that could be evaluated just as the IFFN Testbed was trving to
evaluate air defense C systems. The IFFN Testbed was evaluated as part of its
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certification efTort. Measures were formulated that would eventually determine if the
IFFN Testbed produced valid and credible results. A comparison of the results was
conducted between the values oi' the measures of target identification, allocation, and
engagement from the IFFN Testbed simulation and actual Patriot livefire exercises.
The building of the testbed itself was a background problem and will be covered in
greater detail in the data generation discussion.
C. C- SYSTEM BOUNDING
The bounding of the C system of interest was confirmed by Major Gandee from
previous IFFN efforts. Physical entities were already identified and bounded. Much of
this had been accomplished earlier at the IFFN Testbed but not by using the specific
MCES methodology. The application of this module confirmed that the IFFN C
bounding was sound. The "onion skin" idea was a useful tool and was subsequently
used by the IFFN Testbed to graphically display their bounding.
D. C- PROCESS DEFINITION
The IFFN Testbed originally identified three functions that were performed in
the air defense process and those were: identification, target allocation, and target
acquisition. The IFFN Testbed did conduct a functional analysis of the air defense
process though not in as much detail as the MCES functional analysis. Major Gandee
and the MORS team defined the C'^ process functions of the distributed C^ air defense
system as: detect (D), track (T), identify (ID), assess threat (TA), assign weapon
(WA). allocate weapon (AW), control (C) which were later adopted by the IFFN
Testbed.
E. SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONS
The IFFN Testbed did formulate the alternative C systems that it wanted to
test. Organizational and equipment charts were constructed as well as some
information fiow charts by the IFFN Test Force. The IFFN Testbed baseline criteria
was basically a baseline architecture from which planned derivations would be tested.
In this manner the IFFN Testbed accomplished an integration of system elements and
functions but in less detail than Major Gandee's application. The MCES application
by Major Gandee was more thorough with his information fiow charts, organizational
charts, and structure charts. Alternative organizational structures were determined and
hierarchal charts formulated by both the IFFN Testbed and MCES approaches,
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however, Major Gandee's structures were more detailed and complete. Major Gandee.
through his use of null functions and addmg or deleting physical entities, developed
many different configurations for possible testing. The alternative configurations for
centralized and autonomous (decentralized) control of the Patriot Fire Units was one
of Major Gandee's contributions. This concept was added to the IFF\ Testbed's
analysis.
F. SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES
General categories of measures were sought by the IFFN Testbed to derive
values that would eventually lead to discriminating among the competing air defense
C'^ systems. Early in the development of the IFFN Testbed, the analysts realized that
they could determine difierences between the competing C systems without precisely
knowing which variables were responsible for the difference. As the development of
IFFN Testbed progressed, the analysts knew they needed to determine which variables
were causing the difference.
I. Deriving Measures
When and where does the analyst derive measures in a C system? There
were two different approaches considered by the IFFN Testbed as they derived
measures to evaluate competing C^ systems. The VICES approach utilized the C"
architecture and unique structures to derive their measures. The MCES methodology
built a baseline C architecture with alternative structures to derive where and when
the measures should be determined. The IFFN Testbed approach utilized issues,
objectives, and subobjectives to derive their measures and later built a baseline
architecture to determine where to use the measures. The Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA) conducted extensive research in their attempt to determine measures
for use by the IFFN Testbed [Ref 13]. IDA also basically used a functional
decomposition of the air defense C system to derive its measures. Alphatec. Inc.
developed a petri net model of the IFFN air defense C system and then identified
measures to determine the characteristics of each interconnection in the net [Ref 14].
This massive effort resulted in over 200 measures for their five levels of the system.
There were originally six objectives formulated for Test Series 2 that led to the
IFFN Testbed measures. A new list of objectives was formulated after the MCES
application and appeared in the next revised version of the Test Series 2 test plan and
is listed below. Objectives 2. 6, and 7 were added to Test Series 2 after the MCES
application uncovered the need for them.
69
Objective 1 - Assess and contrast the performance of the PATRIOT battalion
under centralized and decentralized control.
Objective 2 - Evaluate the contribution of adding C^ (Patriot Battalion FDC) to
autonomous Patriot fire unit performance.
Objective 3 - Assess the impact oi' changing and removing Airspace Control
Procedures (.ACPs) on the operational performance o[ the centralized and
decentralized battalion and autonomous fire unit.
Objective 4 - Determine the value and impact of perfect ID and communication
system performance on PATRIOT battalion performance.
Objiective 5 - Evaluate the impact of various changes in direct and indirect ID
peribrmance and interaction.
Objective 6 - Evaluate the contribution of Question and Answer (Q&A) IFF
devices to Patriot Bn and FL performance.
Objective 7 - Evaluate the abilitv of indirect ID information to compensate for
the loss of the direct Q&A IFF device at a Patriot FU.
Objective 8 - Assess the influence of the fire unit ID function on the ablitv of
the P.ATRIOT battalion to perform its functions.
Objective 9 - Identify and subjectivelv evaluate any PATRIOT operational
dehciencies noted during testing. [Ref 11: pp. 2.1,2.2]
2. MOEs versus MOPs
The terminology used by the IFFN Testbed for MOEs and MOPs is directly
opposite of the MCES terminology. MCES states that MOEs are measured outside of
the C" system and that MOPs are measures of the functions within the C" system.
MCES MOPs are used for the C system measurements. Examples of MCES MOPs
would be probability of detection and correct identification. Within the force
boundary, MCES Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are used for measuring the
functions of the C system. Examples of generic MCES MOEs are: timeliness,
accuracy, survivability, capacity, and percent completion. MOFEs are used for the
boundary measurements between the force and the environment. An MCES example
might be the number of enemy aircraft destroyed prior to releasing their weapons.
The IFFN Testbed termed the functional measures as MOEs and their
corresponding submeasures as MOPs. The IFFN Testbed MOEs for Test Series 2
would measure the needed information for the C evaluation objectives. MCES termed
these type of measures as Measures of Performance (MOP) since they were measures
of the air defense functions. There is obvious disagreement in methodologies as to
what to name the different set of measures. This was not an important detail and did
not cause too much difficulty.
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3. Functional Measures
Major Gandee's approach was to utilize the C^ functions as the focal point
for deriving measures. If this approach is to be strictly followed, then each function
would have at least one corresponding probability measure plus time and distance
distribution measures. The measures of probabilities and time and distance ranges for
each function should be the minimum measures used to measure these functions.
Major Gandee proposed these measures and highlighted that all the functions should
have corresponding measures. Table 4 lists the measures that should be included for
the functions.
TABLE 4








IDENTIFY ( ID) P( Identify)
,
Time and Distance
ASSESS THREAT (TA) P( Assess Threat)
,
Time and Distance
ASSIGN WEAPON (WA) P( Assign Weapon),
Time and Distance
ALLOCATE WEAPON (AW) P( Allocate Weapon),
Time and Distance
CONTROL (C) P( Control)
<
Time and Distance
Most of these measures are listed in the test design plan for Test Series 2. Major Grey
of the IFEN Testbed does state that the data for all these measures will be available
but some were not considered for Test Series 2. Some of these functions will be
measured indirectly and the functional measures may be incorporated in later tests if
the results of Test Series 2 reveals that they are needed.
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4. Distributed Functions and Measures
Major Gandee thought that the measures for the XTELL and INTELL
processes must be used to effectively evaluate distributed C" systems. If this is indeed
the case then each function should have at least one corresponding measure of
performance. Examples of these are shown in Table 5 . Most of these measures were
used by the IFFN Testbed. The IFFN Testbed will use their measures of P(Pass).
P(Res), P( Trans), and P(Amp) to measure the indirect ID information flow which will
indirectly measure some of the coordination and intelligence functions. These IFFN
measures and definitions are listed for review and comparison.
• P(Pass) Probability that a passed ID is correct.
• P(Res) Probabilitv that an ID conflict is resolved while the aircraft is still in
the weapon system's measurement volume.
• TfTrans) Distribution of times elapsed between receipt and retransmission of
ID information by a C2 node.
• P(Amp) Probability that an ID includes track, amplification information.
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTED FUNCTIONS AND MOPS
FUNCTION MEASURES
CROSSTELL (XTELL) P( Correct Fusion)




INTELLIGENCE ( INTELL) P( Target Engagement, given
IID was used)
P(Target Engagement, given
IID was not used)
EXECUTION LEVEL
C2 PROCESS
P( Correct ID prior to
engagement)
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5. Operational versus Design/Qualitative Measures
While most evaluations of C systems center around design qualitative
measures such as flexibility, surviveability, availability, etc., the IFFN Testbed used an
approach much like the MCES methodology in that the functions of the system were
first studied before equipment and personnel problems were considered. These
measures are sometimes refered to as operational measures. Examples o[ operational






The IFFN Testbed did not continue their evaluation to include the design qualitative
measures that are definitely needed to determine the utility of a particular competing
C" system. Major Grey did state that design type measures would be incorporated in
later tests and that the data needed for these types of measures was readily available
even for Test Series 2 if the need arose or if a higher authority requested that















Another analyst, Leslie GoUiday, listed a set of generic air defense measures.
Table 6 [Ref 15: p. 788], which are similar to what the MCES appUcation had
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determined. These measures are more general but the specific measures could be
derived from the general measures. Again, the list included function measures as well













C2 MEASURES FOR AIR DEFENSE
DEFINITION
Measures capability of providing
gross positional data on an aircraft
at extended ranges.
Measures the process of providing
specific and timely positional
data with tentative identification
of an aircraft within a designated
range of a unit.
Measures capability to provide
weapons control order (WCOs)
and rules of engagement (ROEs).
Measures capability to provide
avoidance of engagement of









6. Resource Conservation and Reallocation Measures
Major Gandee suggested possible elTiciency and coordination measures which
would reflect the probability of a target being engaged by more than one unit due to
lack of coordination. A network may increase an individual unit's identification
capabilities by supplying more complete ID information from other units which
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formulate the ID information. Major Gandee suggested that an ID accuracy measure
could be used to compare the accuracy of an ID formulated at an organic unit and the
ID information which passes over the network to other units as a system ID. Other
possible measures suggested by Major Gandee were fusing measures that measured the
ability of units to accept and fuse system ID information with its own organic ID
information to improve the ID accuracy in time to use it efiectively. However, the
suggested measures of weapon allocation efficiency, unit ID coordination. ID accuracy,
and ID fusing ability were not used by the IFFN Testbed. Some of these attributes
could be measured indirectly using some of the other IFFN Testbed measures such as
timeliness and the probability of correctly identifying an object to measure ID
information fusing ability.
Determining which competing C consumes less missile resources is very
important considering the cost and shortage of modern missiles. Also, in a dynamic
environment, there will be instances when missile resources will have to be reallocated
due to prior destruction of the target, previous allocation to another weapon, higher
priority targets in the area or the targets flies out of range. Measures of efficiency and
reallocation ability seemed to be crucial differences in the competing C" systems.
Again, Major Gandee suggested such measures but they were not all incorporated into
the current Test Series 2 plan. Research by Alphatec, Inc. with Petri nets also
suggested reallocation measures for the IFFN Testbed [Ref 14].
G. DATA GENERATION AND TESTBED DESIGN
Major Gandees proposed application of MCES to the IFFN basically stopped at
Module 5, Specification of Measures due to time constraints and the delay of Test
Series 2 execution. As a result, the MCES data generation and aggregation and
interpretation modules were not evaluated for Test Series 2 by Major Gandee.
The current MCES does incorporate a experimental design methodology for
building testbeds to generate data. A methodology. Systems Effectiveness Analysis
(SEA), was introduced by A. H. Levis and P. Derskin [Ref. 16] for evaluating large
scale systems such as testbeds and ultimately integrated into the MCES methodology.
To produce valid data, a testbed must be credible and SEA was developed to assist in
validating testbeds. SEA was also developed to determine the minimum number of
experiments needed to evaluate the system and to formulate a optimal sequence of
improvements areas for the competing configurations. Once the testbed was
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determined to be credible, experiments could be run that would determine the optimal
elTectiveness of each alternative C"" system.
One of Dr. Levis' students, Phillipe Martain, demonstrated how SEA could be
applied to the IFFN Testbed. First in the SEA process was the determination of the
smallest number of experiments that were needed to be run to evaluate the
effectiveness of the testbed system. A simplified mathematical model utilizing
Lanchester type combat models was developed to determine the minimum number of
experiments required to evaluate the testbed. The testbed experimental results and the
mathematical model results could also be compared to insure similar results. In a
second phase, a system planning procedure was used to select the best evolution path
for the testbed configurations from a fixed set of improvements. SEA can be then used
in the last MCES module of Data Aggregation and Interpretation to make adjustments
to the testbed experiments. [Ref 17]
H. OVERLAPPING OF PROCEDURES AND TOOLS
The IFFN Testbed has been working on its air air defense C^ problem for a
number of years and through its iterative process evolved to a solution that was close
to the MCES solution. The IFFN Testbed started without the aid of MCES and some
of the applied MCES methodology overlapped with the previous methods used by the
IFFN Joint Test Force. However, in most cases both methodologies resulted in the
same general results. The IFFN Testbed did make changes after the MCES
application, but it is not clear if these changes will have a major impact on Test Series
2 since the test has not been completed.
MCES does integrate and imbed current evaluation tools. MCES does not
preclude these tools and in fact uses them to obtain a better solution to the problem.
Both the IFFN and MCES methods came to the same general conclusions, however
the MCES approach appeared to be more complete. The MCES methodology
attempts to standardize the analysis by providing a structured template to assist the
analysts in their evaluations.
1. Problem Formulation and Bounding
The problem formulation and bounding of the C2 system were almost
identical. Most system analysis methodologies start out in this same manner.
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2. Functional Analysis
Other system analysis approaches use the basic input, process, and output
approach to describing the C" system. Functional and process analysis are bemg used
often in the software engineermg environment. These approaches are similar to C.
West Churchman's system process of input, process, and output as explained by
Schoderbek. et al. [Ref. 18: pp. 8-29]. It is interesting to note that major methodology
revisions occured when analysts attempted to automate systems because they needed to
precisely describe and recreate the functioning of the manual system.
3. Model or Architecture Building
The system analysis approach of utilizing the functions of the system to build
a systems model has been used in a number of previous evaluations. Other researchers
have added methods of modeling that can be integrated into the MCES methodology.
A specific example already referenced is Systems Effectiveness Analysis (SEA). Dr.
Levis has conducted stimulating research in this bottom-up approach and has
integrated it into the MCES methodology [Ref. 19]. The SEA methodology insures
that the simulation can simulate the whole range or Umits of the interactions between
the variables instead of a smaller subset of the interaction range or limit. This can be
accompUshed by taking estabUshed measures and and determining their minimum and
maximum ranges. The other quantitative methods of SEA can also be applied to the
IFFN Testbed.
Petri Nets have been used by researchers and analysts to mathematically
model the different structures of information flow in the C architecture in the form of
off and on states which can be used to describe a C architecture with unique
structures. Alphatec, Inc. [Ref. 14] conducted a study of the IFFN Testbed and
constructed a number of different level petri nets to determine what measures were
needed to measure what kind and how much information flowed between all the nodes.
Basically, each connection between the nodes was an opportunity to measure
information flow.
4. IFFN and MCES Measure Specification
The IFFN Test Force used its issues to formulate their original measures.
However, there were no major deficiencies in the test design of Test Series 1 which was
completed prior to the MCES application. There was prior research conducted by the
Institute for Defense Analysis [Ref. 13] and Alphatec [Ref. 14] concerning the
evaluation of the IFFN competing C systems and they confirmed the measures
derived by the MCES application.
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1. COMPARISON SUMMARY
The IFFN Testbed has already taken advantage of the good ideas generated by
the MCES application and the Test Series 2 plan has incorporated some of the VICES
concepts. Although each methodology used different and similar tools to evaluate the
competing C" systems, both approaches came to the same general conclusions. The
question of whether the amount of time needed to document all possible interactions in
the MCES is really needed is still unanswered. However after utilizing the MCES
approach of analyzing the physical entites, organizational structure, and C functions
in a systematic methodology, the IFFN Test Force discovered a number of important
measures that they had not focussed on earlier in the test design process for Test Series
2. Only with more testing and comparisons will the true value of the MCES approach
to the IFFN Testbed be known. Conclusions and recommendations concerning both
the IFFN Testbed and MCES are included in Chapter VI of this thesis.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. IFFN CONCLUSIONS
It is clearly evident that the IFFN Testbed has made some progress in solving
some of the IFFN air defense problems. The problem is definitely complex and the
IFFN Testbed has understandably committed large amount of resources to the
problem. The Testbed is a good concept for an experimental design to test alternative
C^ systems since all of the alternative systems can not be tested using actual
equipment due to resource constraints or present C configuration limitations. The
IFFN Test Force was careful to insure that the testbed was credible. Only one test
series has been completed with Test Series 2 to begin in March 1987. The IFFN Joint
Testbed has provided an excellent opportunity to test and refine MCES. The IFFN
Testbed is still valuable as a suitable data generator for further evaluatation and
refinement of MCES.
The IFFN Testbed has already taken advantage of the good results generated by
the MCES application and the Test Series 2 plan has incorporated some of the MCES
ideas. After utilizing the MCES approach of analyzing the physical entites,
organizational structure, and C functions in a systematic methodology, the IFFN Test
Force discovered a number of important measures they had not focussed on earlier in
the test design process for Test Series 2. The test design issues and measures were
modified to accommodate the newly found distributed relationships between C"" nodes
that were originally not formulated by the IFFN Joint Test Force.
B. IFFN RECOMMENDATIONS
An additional measure approach would be to utilize both operational and
equipment design, quahty measures. The functional measures are operational measures
and the design, quality measures are more machine and resource oriented. The IFFN
Testbed seems to have focused its measures on operational or functional measures and
has not taken full advantage of available and possibly critical design qualitative
measures such as resource efficiency.
The IFFN Testbed should consider Vlajor Gandee's recommendations on the
additional measures of performance and etTectiveness, particularly the measures of
coordination and resource allocation. Resource allocation, connectivity, availability.
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surviveahility. sustainability, and nexibility data appears to be available from the data
collection points in the simulations. The measures for the XTELL and INTELL
processes must be used to eOectively evaluate distributed C systems.
C. MCES APPLICATION CONCLUSIONS
The IFFN Testbed has been working on its air defense C problem for a number
of years and through its iterative process evolved to a solution that was close to the
same results. There is a learning curve associated with applying any new methodology
which was quite evident in this IFFN application. During the MCES application to
the IFFN Testbed. there was overlap of the evaluation tools used by the IFFN Test
Force. Some of the tools used prior to the MCES application to the IFFN Testbed
were included in the MCES methodology. MCES does not preclude these tools and in
fact uses them to aid in the evaluation to obtain the best results. This MCES
application was a good start in the evolving of a generic standard C system evaluation
method. The MCES approach of systematically outlining the physical entities,
structure, and C" process functions insured that all areas were covered. Major
Gandee's proposed application was used by the IFFN Operational Analysis section to
better understand their air defense C problem. The MCES approach seemed to be
more detailed and complete. New relationships were uncovered by Major Gandee
resulting in the addition o^ new issues and measures. MCES has definitely helped in
highlighting the functional measures that have been overlooked in previous C"
evaluations. MCES did assist the IFFN Testbed.
1. Integration of System Elements and Functions Module
Major Gandee uncovered the need for the additional module 4, Integration oi'
System Elements and Functions, that was not originally conceived as a part of the
MCES modules. A model or architecture was needed to establish a baseline with
alternative structures to represent the competing C systems. The system must be
understood before attempting to measure its utility and uncover the variables are
responsible for significant difTerences. By actually using MCES, some problems
surfaced which ultimately resulted in refinements to the MCES methodology.
2. Distributed C Process Functions
The distributed functions are required to characterize the coordination and
intelligence sharing of distributed C" systems. There are different levels of these
distributed functions and the C~ structures can become very complex. MCES's
distributed functions assist in describing these complexities.
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3. Solid Evaluation Tool
MCES appears to be a viable C evaluation template of current and evolving
tools based on solid C" theor>'. MCES has provided the C^ analyst community with a
theoretical framework for determining the utility of a C" system.
4. MCES Application to Additional IFFN Testbed Test Series
The IFFN Testbed did revise their Test Series 2 plan to incorporate most of
Major Gandees results of applying VICES. Vlajor Grey has also utilized some of the
concepts of MCES to formulate the design plan for Test Series 3. As more test series
are completed, a more through evaluation of MCES can be made.
D. MCES RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Continued MCES Application to the IFFN Testbed
The application of MCES to the IFFN Testbed should be continued on Test
Series 2 and followmg tests. Due to time constraints and the delay of the Test Series 2
execution, the fmal results were not available for analysis in this thesis as was originally
envisioned. The areas of actual data generation and aggregation of measures and
interpretation for Test Series 2 still could be a valuable thesis topic for a follow-on
project. This follow-on project could document and evaluate the success of the
previous implementation of MCES and observe new implementations. \ comparison
of Test Series 1 with Test Series 2 results might reveal the differences in the approach
and the results with the caveat that Test Series 2 was a slightly different simulation
than Test Series 1.
2. Further MCES Testing and Refinement
More beginning to end C applications of MCES should be conducted to
continue the evolution of the MCES methodology.
3. Integration of More C Evaluation Tools
MCES does integrate a number of tools and could still integrate more while
maintaining its solid theoretical base. The MCES approach is a top-down systems
approach with certain advantages and disadvantages. Utilizing Dr. Levis' experimental
design and bottom-up approach, Systems Effectiveness Analysis (SEA), would benefit
the MCES toolbox. Petri nets show promise of being a good analyst tool for
evaluating information flow. Other system evaluation methods should also researched
for addition to the MCES methodology.
4. Standard MCES Terminology and Definitions
MCES developers must decide on standard terminology and definitions to
avoid confusion. Although MCES should be robust and flexible to analysts, a firm
evaluation theory must be presented in simple, standard terminology.
5. Education and Dissemination
There is a learning curve associated with any new or revised methodology
which was quite evident in this I PEN application. After a standard terminology is
defined, MCES should be announced and advertised to the C analyst and decision
maker community because of its sound theoretical background. More disclosure of
MCES is definitely needed. Since MCES does incorporate a number of known tools,
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